Signalling in auctions: experimental evidence by Bos, Olivier et al.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  O L I V I E R  B O S ,  F R A N C I S C O  G O M E Z - M A R T I N E Z , 
S A N D E R  O N D E R S T A L ,  A N D  T O M  T R U Y T S
/ /  N O . 2 1 - 0 3 7  |  0 4 / 2 0 2 1





































In	 many	 auction	 settings,	 bidders	 care	 about	 how	 their	 behaviour	 in	 the	 auction	 is	
interpreted	 by	 others.	 Market	 analysts	 can	 consider	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 firm	 in	 an	
auction,	winning	or	losing,	as	a	signal	of	the	firm’s	management	quality,	financial	position,	




such	 settings,	 signalling	 concerns	 constitute	 an	 additional	 component	 in	 a	 bidder’s	
bidding	strategy.	 In	the	past	 two	decades,	 the	theoretical	 literature	has	devoted	ample	
attention	to	signalling	in	auctions.4		
In	 this	paper,	we	study	how	various	auction	 formats	perform	in	 terms	of	revenue	 in	a	
setting	where	bidders	can	signal	information	through	their	bids	to	an	outside	observer.	




To	 our	 knowledge,	 ours	 is	 the	 first	 laboratory	 experiment	 comparing	 various	 auction	
formats	 in	a	setting	where	bidders	have	signalling	concerns.	 It	provides	a	 first	 step	 to	
understanding	the	relative	performance	of	auctions	in	such	settings,	which	may	inform	
future	theoretical	and	empirical	research	on	auctions.	











1	Liu	 (2012)	argues	 that	 signalling	 incentives	could	arise	 in	bidding	contests	where	 the	winning	bidder	
issues	equity	or	debt	for	financing	her	payment.	
2	Mandel	 (2009)	 distinguishes	 three	main	motives	 for	 buying	 art:	 investment,	 direct	 consumption,	 and	
signalling,	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 latter	 two	 explain	 the	 old	 puzzle	 as	 to	 why	 art	 systematically	
underperforms	as	an	investment	compared	to	bonds	and	equity. 
3	Charities	often	raise	funds	by	auctioning	objects	provided	to	them	by	celebrities	(Schram	and	Onderstal,	
2009).	 A	 broad	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 literature	 suggests	 that	 signalling	 and	 status	 are	 important	







(rather	 than	 her	 bid),	 revenue	 equivalence	 breaks	 down.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 SP	 auction	
dominates	the	FP	auction	in	terms	of	expected	revenue	(Giovannoni	and	Makris,	2014;	







We	 experimentally	 test	 these	 results	 using	 Bos	 and	 Truyts’	 (2020)	 framework.	 We	
consider	a	symmetric	independent	private	values	setting	in	which	the	bidders	care	about	
the	 beliefs	 of	 an	 outside	 observer	 about	 their	 values.	 The	 outside	 observer	 is	 partly	
informed	about	the	auction	outcome	and	uses	this	information	to	update	her	beliefs	about	




in	 line	with	public	policy:	 in	 the	EU,	a	Directive	on	Public	Procurement	stipulates	 that	
information	about	payments	must	be	incorporated	in	a	contract	award	notice.6	Moreover,	





in	 signalling	 games.7	 Auctions	with	 signalling	 opportunities	 to	 outside	 observers	 have	
hardly	been	analysed	in	the	lab.8	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	Fonseca	et	al.	(2020)	is	
the	only	exception.	They	consider	a	setting	where	bidders	can	signal	their	productivity	to	
firms	 that	 are	 hiring	 on	 a	 labour	 market.	 Fonseca	 et	 al.	 (2020)	 focus	 on	 several	
information	disclosure	policies	within	 the	 same	auction	 format:	 the	 FP	 auction.	While	
they	 find	 that	 signalling	 opportunities	 lead	 to	 more	 aggressive	 bids,	 they	 observe	
consistent	underbidding	compared	to	equilibrium.	Our	experimental	results	complement	
theirs	in	that	our	design	facilitates	between-auction	comparisons.	




2014	 on	 public	 procurement:	 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-













AP	and	 the	FP	auctions,	but	not	 in	 the	SP	auction.	The	outside	observer’s	 tendency	 to	
overestimate	the	winners’	values	relative	to	the	losers’	in	the	AP	auction	when	the	bidders	
payments	 are	 revealed	 partly	 explains	 why	 AP	 auction	 outperforms	 the	 winner-pay	
auctions.	 Finally,	 we	 observe	 that	 the	 AP	 auction	 where	 the	 bidders’	 payments	 are	
revealed	 underperforms	 in	 terms	 of	 efficiency	 relative	 to	 the	winner-pay	 auctions.	 In	
other	words,	we	find	a	trade-off	between	revenue	and	efficiency.	
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 Section	 2,	 we	 describe	 our	



















the	 same	 group.	 We	 provided	 computerized	 instructions	 to	 the	 participants.	 The	
instructions	 for	treatment	FPWP	can	be	 found	in	Appendix	D.10	Before	the	experiment	
started,	 participants	 answered	 test	 questions	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 they	 understood	 the	
experimental	protocol.11	Sessions	lasted	between	45	and	75	minutes.	Payment	consisted	






rounds.	 The	 exchange	 rate	 was	 1	 euro	 for	 50	 experimental	 points.	 On	 average,	
participants	earned	14.61	euros	(including	the	show-up	fee).	
In	all	sessions,	participants	interacted	in	fixed	groups	of	four	(no	rematching).	In	each	of	









Treatment	 Auction	 Information	to	the	outside	observer	 Do	bidders’	payoffs	depend	on	outside	observer’s	estimate?	
FPW	 FP	 The	winner	 Yes	
FPWP	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 Yes	
SPW	 SP	 The	winner	 Yes	
SPWP	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 Yes	
APW	 AP	 The	winner	 Yes	
APWP	 AP	 The	winner	and	the	bidders’	payments	 Yes	
FPWcontrol	 FP	 The	winner	 No	
FPWPcontrol	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 No	
SPWcontrol	 SP	 The	winner	 No	
SPWPcontrol	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 No	
APWcontrol	 AP	 The	winner	 No	





constant	 across	 treatments.	 In	 the	 auction,	 each	 of	 the	 three	 bidders	 independently	










𝜋!(𝑤, 𝑝, 𝑣! , 𝑣(!) = +
𝑣! − 𝑝 + 𝑣(!/2 if	𝑤 = 𝑖
−𝑝 + 𝑣(!/2 if	𝑤 ≠ 𝑖
	,	
where	𝑤	denotes	 the	auction	winner,	𝑝	 the	bidders’	payments	 (which	 is	zero	 for	non-





outside	 investors	 so	 that	 the	 firm	 may	 be	 able	 to	 attract	 financial	 resources	 under	
favourable	conditions	in	the	future.	
In	all	treatments,	the	outside	observer	was	informed	about	which	bidder	won	the	auction	
before	 reporting	 her	 estimates.	 In	 the	WP	 treatments,	 she	 also	 obtained	 information	
regarding	how	much	the	bidders	paid.	The	payoffs	of	the	outside	observer	depended	on	
the	accuracy	of	her	estimates,	also	in	the	control	treatments.	Once	she	had	entered	value	










In	 this	 section,	we	 describe	 the	 theoretical	 predictions.13	Most	 of	 the	 analysis	 follows	
straightforwardly	 from	 Bos	 and	 Truyts	 (2020).	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 add	 the	 theoretical	








13	 As	 is	 common	 in	 the	 experimental	 literature	 on	 auctions,	 our	 theoretical	 predictions	 are	 based	 on	 a	














FPW	 FP	 The	winner	 𝐵(𝑣) ≈
2
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𝐵(𝑣) = 𝑣	 𝑅 = 75	
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FPWcontrol	 FP	 The	winner	 𝐵(𝑣) =
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the	 bidders’	 payoffs.	 Therefore,	 the	 predictions	 are	 standard,	 and	 imply	 revenue	
equivalence	across	treatments	(see,	e.g.,	Vickrey,	1961).	If	only	the	identity	of	the	winner	
is	revealed	to	the	outside	observer,	bidders’	payoffs	when	winning	are	increased	by	half	
the	difference	between	 the	outside	observer’s	 value	 estimates	 for	winners	 and	 losers.	
Equilibrium	 bids	 are	 inflated	 by	 this	 number	 compared	 to	 the	 control	 treatments.	 In	
Appendix	A,	we	show	that	a	bidder’s	expected	payoff	from	winning	the	auction	(and	hence	
her	equilibrium	bid)	is	increased	by	about	22.	
If	 both	 the	winner	 and	 the	 bidders’	 payments	 are	 revealed,	 the	 bidders	will	 take	 into	
























of	winning	 or	 losing	 the	 auction.	As	 a	 result,	 bidders	 have	 a	 stronger	 incentive	 to	 bid	
aggressively	than	if	only	the	winner’s	identity	is	revealed	so	that	the	equilibrium	bids	are	
higher	than	in	a	situation	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed.	






















In	 this	 section,	 we	 present	 our	 experimental	 results.	 We	 start	 in	 subsection	 4.1	 by	
comparing	 the	 auction	 revenue	 between	 treatments.	 In	 subsection	 4.2,	 we	 analyse	
bidding	behaviour.	 In	 subsection	4.3,	we	discuss	 the	outside	observer’s	 estimates	 and	
























































Now,	we	 turn	 to	 the	main	 treatments.	The	AP	auction	where	both	 the	winner	and	 the	
bidders’	payments	are	communicated	to	the	outside	observer	yields	the	highest	revenue	






Dependent	variable	 	 Regressor	 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	 Revenue	 Revenue	 Revenue	
HighestValue	 1.294***	 1.29***	 2.14***	
	 (0.109)	 (0.109)	 (0.248)	
FPWP	 -62.64***	 	 33.24	
	 (9.233)	 	 (21.275)	
FPW	 -69.75***	 -7.11**	 38.47*	
	 (8.830)	 (3.372)	 (19.837)	
SPWP	 -77.85***	 -15.21***	 9.33	
	 (8.799)	 (3.291)	 (20.591)	
SPW	 -74.60***	 -11.96***	 2.64	
	 (9.124)	 (4.079)	 (21.45)	
APWP	 	 62.64***	 	
	 	 (9.233)	 	
APW	 -50.01***	 12.63*	 -11.17	
	 (10.83)	 (7.108)	 (32.43)	
HighestValue*FPWP	 	 	 -1.20***	
	 	 	 (0.283)	
HighestValue*FPW	 	 	 -1.35***	
	 	 	 (0.259)	
HighestValue*SPWP	 	 	 -1.09***	
	 	 	 (0.269)	
HighestValue*SPW	 	 	 -0.97***	
	 	 	 (0.269)	
HighestValue*APW	 	 	 -0.48	
	 	 	 (0.444)	
Constant	 39.473***	 -23.167**	 -28.39	
	 (11.74)	 (8.606)	 (19.702)	
Observations	 1260	 1260	 1260	
Adjusted	R	squared	 0.386	 0.386	 0.403	
Notes:	Clustered	 standard	 errors	 in	 parentheses.	 APWP	 is	 the	 reference	 treatment	 in	 (1).	 FPWP	 is	 the	
reference	treatment	in	(2).	HighestValue	denotes	the	highest	value	among	the	three	bidders.	FPWP,	FPW,	
SPWP,	 SPW,	APWP	 and	APW	are	 dummy	 variables	which	 are	 equal	 to	 1	 if	 and	 only	 if	 the	 observation	
involves	treatments	FPWP,	FPW,	SPWP,	SPW,	APWP	and	APW	respectively.	*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01.	


















same	 as	 in	 the	 control	 treatments	 (although	 not	 all	 differences	 are	 significant	 in	 the	
control	 treatments),	 which,	 as	 said,	 is	 in	 line	 with	 what	 is	 typically	 observed	 in	 the	
experimental	literature.	This	begs	the	question	as	to	what	extent	the	revenue	ranking	is	
caused	by	 the	 outside	 observer	 estimates	 affecting	bidder	payments.	We	 address	 that	
































Notes:	Clustered	 standard	 errors	 in	 parentheses.	 APWP	 is	 the	 reference	 treatment	 in	 (1).	 FPWP	 is	 the	
reference	treatment	in	(2).	FPWP,	FPW,	SPWP,	SPW,	APWP	and	APW	are	dummy	variables	which	are	equal	







Result	 1:	 In	 the	 FP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 her	 payment	 significantly	
increases	auction	revenue	as	compared	to	the	case	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed.		
Result	 2:	 In	 the	 SP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 her	 payment	 does	 not	
significantly	 increase	auction	 revenue	as	 compared	 to	 the	 case	where	only	 the	winner	 is	
revealed.	
Result	 3:	 In	 the	 AP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 the	 bidders’	 payments	
significantly	 increase	auction	 revenue	as	 compared	 to	 the	 case	where	only	 the	winner	 is	
revealed.	
Results	1	and	3	confirm	hypotheses	1	and	3.	FPWP	and	APWP	yield	higher	revenues	for	




not	 differ	 significantly	 between	 SPWP	 and	 SPW	 (p=0.41).	 This	 result	 contradicts	
hypothesis	2.		
Result	 4:	When	 both	 the	 winner’s	 identity	 and	 bidders’	 payments	 are	 revealed,	 the	 FP	
auction	raises	significantly	more	money	than	the	SP	auction	does.	
Result	4	is	inconsistent	with	hypothesis	4.	The	analysis	of	bidding	behaviour	in	subsection	
4.2	 sheds	 more	 light	 on	 this	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 experimental	 results	 and	 the	
theoretical	predictions.	
Result	 5:	When	 both	 the	 winner’s	 identity	 and	 bidders’	 payments	 are	 revealed,	 the	 AP	
auction	raises	significantly	more	money	than	the	FP	and	SP	auctions	do.	















influences	 bidders’	 payoffs.	 The	 scatterplots	 in	 Figures	 3–5	 indicate	 that	 the	 bid	
distributions	in	the	control	treatments	are	in	line	with	what	is	commonly	observed	in	FP,	
SP,	and	AP	auctions	in	the	lab	(see,	e.g.,	Kagel	(1995),	Noussair	and	Silver	(2006),	Schram	











than	 in	equilibrium,	while	high-value	bidders	submit	slightly	 lower	bids.	For	FPW,	 the	
estimated	bidding	curve	lies	below	the	theoretical	prediction	(p=0.03	and	p=0.02	for	the	
differences	 in	 slope	 and	 intercept,	 respectively,	 between	 the	 observed	 bids	 and	 the	
theoretical	prediction)	 for	 low	and	 intermediate	values.	As	 the	scatter	plot	 in	Figure	3	











tend	 to	 significantly	 underbid	 relative	 to	 the	 equilibrium	predictions.16	 In	 SPWP,	 low-








and	 the	 theoretical	 prediction).	 Bidders	 optimally	 bid	 22	 points	 above	 their	 value	
according	to	the	equilibrium	prediction	in	SPW.	In	contrast,	subjects	do	not	always	submit	







higher	bids	 in	 SPWP	 than	 in	 SPW	(the	 intercept	 is	 significantly	higher	 in	 SPWP).	This	
result	is	reversed	for	high-value	bidders	(bidding	function	is	significantly	steeper	in	SPW).	
As	such,	these	findings	are	qualitatively	in	line	with	the	theoretical	predictions.	







equilibrium	 prediction	 crucially	 depend	 on	 the	 outside	 observer	 making	 the	 correct	
 17	








predictions	 for	 APWP	 and	 APW.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 bidding	 behaviour	 is	 very	 noisy	




















upon	 them.	 In	 this	 subsection,	we	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 outside	 observer’s	





















difference	 between	 the	 value	 of	 the	 winners	 and	 the	 value	 of	 the	 losers	 is	 slightly	
overestimated	 in	 the	APW	auction.	 In	particular,	 the	estimated	difference	between	the	




losers	 depending	 on	 the	 information	 received	 regarding	 the	 bidders’	 payments	 (the	
highest	bid	in	FPWP,	the	second	highest	bid	in	SPWP,	and	all	bids	in	APWP).	Estimates	for	








value	 of	 the	winner	 and	 the	 values	 of	 the	 losers	 is	 clearly	 overestimated	 in	APWP.	 In	




the	 APWP	 auction	 (p<0.01	 for	 all	 comparisons),	 which	 may	 partly	 explain	 why	 this	
mechanism	yields	the	highest	average	revenue	among	all	mechanisms. 
Result	10:	The	difference	between	the	outside	observers’	value	estimates	for	winners	and	
those	 for	 losers	are	higher	 in	APWP	 than	 in	 the	other	main	 treatments.	Moreover,	 these	
























SPWP,	SPW,	and	APW	are	dummy	variables	which	are	equal	to	1	 if	and	only	 if	 the	observation	involves	




























are	 the	 earnings	 of	 the	 outside	 observer	 at	 period	 𝑡,	 and	 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒!"	 is	 the	 outside	
observer’s	 estimate	 of	 bidder	 𝑖	 at	 period	 𝑡.	 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟"	 measures	 the	 auction’s	
allocative	 efficiency.	 The	 second	 term	 expresses	 the	 payoffs	 of	 the	 outside	 observer,	
which	 is	a	measure	of	 the	accuracy	of	 the	outside	observer’s	estimation.	The	 last	 term	
represents	the	sum	of	the	payoffs	obtained	by	the	three	bidders	through	the	estimates	




















	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
FPWP	 13.476**	 5.232**	 1.166	 7.379*	
	 (4.384)	 (1.544)	 (1.458)	 (3.641)	
FPW	 3.336	 7.966***	 -3.052*	 -1.299	
	 (4.814)	 (2.077)	 (1.676)	 (3.000)	
SPWP	 12.926*	 4.323*	 -1.061	 10.130*	
	 (6.099)	 (2.107)	 (1.376)	 (4.540)	
SPW	 9.368	 5.875*	 -2.819*	 6.346	
	 (5.510)	 (2.550)	 (1.480)	 (4.458)	
APW	 -19.275*	 -2.896	 -4.544*	 -11.704**	
	 (10.080)	 (4.220)	 (2.151)	 (3.367)	
	 	 	 	 	
Constant	 164.993***	 70.225***	 16.943***	 77.547***	
	 (3.857)	 (1.900)	 (1.087)	 (3.113)	
Observations	 1260	 1,260	 1,260	 3780	
Notes:	Clustered	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	APWP	is	the	reference	treatment	in	(1)–(4).	FPWP,FPW,	






and	 APW	 (p=0.03,	 p=0.09	 and	 p=0.04)	 respectively.	 Therefore,	 more	 information	
increases	overall	average	efficiency	in	all	three	auction	formats.		
Table	8:	Allocative	efficiency	

















FPWP	 71.9%	 +12.57%**	 93.9%	 +7.55%***	 0.633	
FPW	 83.3%	 +24.00%***	 97.5%	 +11.23%***	 0.800	
SPWP	 76.2%	 +16.86%**	 92.7%	 +6.39%*	 0.490	
SPW	 75.2%	 +15.90%*	 95.0%	 +8.64%**	 0.590	
APWP	 59.3%	 	 86.3%	 	 0.367	
APW	 60.0%	 +0.67%	 82.8%	 -3.56%	 0.377	
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APWP	 than	 in	all	FP	and	SP	 treatments	as	Table	7	 shows.	Table	8	presents	 two	other	
measures	of	allocative	efficiency:	the	percentage	of	auctions	in	which	the	bidder	with	the	
highest	value	wins	and	the	winner’s	value	as	a	fraction	of	the	highest	value.	Also	according	
to	 these	 measures,	 the	 AP	 auction	 performs	 significantly	 worse	 than	 the	 FP	 and	 SP	
auctions	in	terms	of	allocative	efficiency.		
APWP’s	ranking	of	allocative	efficiency	 is	rooted	 in	 the	noisiness	of	bidding	behaviour	
measured	by	the	goodness	of	fit	of	third-order	polynomial	bidding	curves	(see	Table	8).	
In	 Appendix	 C,	 we	 present	 scatterplots	 of	 individual	 bidding	 strategies	 in	 APWP.	We	
observe	subjects	deviating	from	the	symmetric	equilibrium	in	two	important	ways.	First	
of	all,	 instead	of	bidding	according	 to	strictly	 increasing	bidding	curves,	some	subjects	
tend	to	bid	zero	or	high	bids,	potentially	resulting	in	inefficient	allocations.	Second,	there	
is	a	lot	of	heterogeneity	in	terms	of	individual	bidding	strategies,	which	can	also	result	in	
inefficient	 allocations.	 Both	 patterns	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	 of	 Noussair	 and	
Silver	(2006)	and	Müller	and	Schotter	(2010),	who	ran	experiments	on	the	all-pay	auction	






Bidders’	 payoffs	 from	 estimates	 follows	 a	 similar	 pattern	 as	 overall	 efficiency.	 In	
particular,	APWP	does	significantly	worse	in	this	dimension	than	FPWP	and	SPWP.	We	
also	find	that	in	FPWP,	SPWP,	and	APWP,	bidders	obtain	significantly	higher	payoffs	from	
the	 outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 than	 in	 FPW,	 SPW	 and	 APW,	 respectively	 (p=0.03,	





payments	and	 thereby	 the	bids	of	each	bidder	are	 revealed	 to	 the	outside	observer	 in	
APWP,	whereas	the	latter	only	observes	one	out	of	three	bids	in	the	FPWP	and	SPWP.			













in	 recent	 literature.	 Still,	 our	 paper	 is	 the	 first	 experimental	 study	 that	 examines	 the	





auctioneer	 reveals	 about	 the	 auction	 on	 bidding	 behaviour.	 In	 the	 experiment,	 we	




revealed	 performs	 the	 best	 among	 the	 mechanisms	 studied	 in	 terms	 of	 revenue.	
Moreover,	revealing	the	bidders’	payments	inflates	the	bids	in	the	first-price	and	the	all-
pay	sealed-bid	auctions,	but	it	does	not	do	so	in	the	second-price	sealed-bid	auction.	These	
findings	 are	 robust	 in	 that	we	obtain	qualitatively	 the	 same	 results	 in	 a	difference-in-
difference	analysis	where	we	compare	the	revenues	in	the	main	treatments	correcting	for	
the	 revenues	 obtained	 in	 control	 treatments	 where	 bidders	 do	 not	 have	 signalling	




all-pay	 sealed-bid	 auction	 in	 terms	 of	 revenue	 is	 compromised	 by	 a	 loss	 in	 efficiency	
relative	to	the	winner-pay	auctions.	
Overall,	our	experimental	results	suggest	that	in	a	context	where	bidders	care	about	how	
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bidders,	indexed	𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛,	bidding	for	a	single,	indivisible	object.	Bidders’	values	for	the	













Assume	 that	 bidders	 bid	 according	 to	 a	 strictly	 increasing	 bidding	 curve	𝐵(𝑣).	 Now,	
consider	a	bidder	with	a	value	𝑣	bidding	as	if	her	value	were	𝑤 ∈ [0, ?̅?].	If	the	other	bidders	
stick	to	the	equilibrium	bidding	curve,	this	bidder’s	expected	payoffs	equal	












= 𝑓(%)(𝑣)(𝑣 − 𝐵(𝑣) + 𝛾𝑣) − 𝐹(%)(𝑣)(𝐵+(𝑣) − 𝛾) − 𝛾𝑉W(𝑣)𝑓(%)(𝑣) = 0	
⇔ 𝑓(%)(𝑣)(𝐵(𝑣) − 𝛾𝑣) + 𝐹(%)(𝑣)(𝐵+(𝑣) − 𝛾) = 	 \𝑣 − 𝛾𝑉W(𝑣)]𝑓(%)(𝑣),	
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∫ \𝑥 − 𝛾𝑉W(𝑥)]𝑑𝐹(%)(𝑥)(,
𝐹(%)(𝑣)
+ 𝛾𝑣.	
For	the	parameters	used	in	the	experiment	(𝛾 = 1/2,	𝑛 = 3,	𝐹 = 𝑈[0,1]),	we	have	𝑉W(𝑥) =






highest	 bidder	with	 probability	𝐻(𝑣) = (𝑛 − 1)𝐹./-(𝑣)(1 − 𝐹(𝑣))	 and	 another	 bidder	
with	 probability	 𝐾(𝑣) = (𝑛 − 1)𝐹./-(𝑣) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐹./%(𝑣).	 We	 denote	 ℎ	 and	 𝑘	 the	
density	functions	associated	with	𝐻	and	𝐾respectively.	Therefore	the	bidder’s	expected	
payoffs	equal	
𝑈(𝑣,𝑤) = V 𝑣 − 𝐵(𝑥) + 𝛾𝑉(𝑥)
*
,


















= 𝑓(%)(𝑣)\𝑣 − 𝐵(𝑣) + 𝛾𝑉(𝑣)] + ℎ(𝑣)𝛾𝐿(𝑣) + 𝐻(𝑣)𝛾𝐿+(𝑣) − 𝛾𝐿(𝑣)𝑘(𝑣)
= 0	












For	the	parameters	used	in	the	experiment	(𝛾 = 1/2,	𝑛 = 3,	𝐹 = 𝑈[0,1]),	we	have	𝑉(𝑣) =
%5(
-
, 𝐿(𝑣) = #
6
𝑣, 𝐹(%)(𝑣) = 𝑣-, 𝐻(𝑣) = 2𝑣(1 − 𝑣),	𝐾(𝑣) = 𝑣(2 − 𝑣)	and	𝐹(%)(𝑣) = 𝑣-	from	












= 𝑓(%)(𝑣)𝑣 − 𝐵′(𝑣) + 𝛾 = 0	
Hence,	taking	into	account	the	boundary	condition	𝐵(𝑣) = 0:	




For	the	parameters	used	in	the	experiment	(𝛾 = 1/2,	𝑛 = 3,	𝐹 = 𝑈[0,1]),	it	follows	that	










V |𝑤 − 𝑣|𝑑𝐺(𝑣)
()
,
= V (𝑤 − 𝑣)𝑑𝐺(𝑣)
*
,
















equals	 𝑤 = 100/√2' ≈ 79.	 W.r.t.	 the	 guesses	 for	 the	 losing	 bidders,	 𝐺(𝑣) = #(-,, −





































	 Bid	 Theoretical	 	 	 Bid	 Theoretical	
	 (APWP)	 prediction	 	 	 (APW)	 prediction	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Intercept	 8.159	 0	 	 Intercept	 6.588**	 0	
	 (4.428)	 	 	 	 (2.192)	 	
Value	 0.560***	 0.5	 	 Value2	 0.002	 0.0022	
	 (0.132)	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	
Value3	 0.0000317*	 0.000067	 	 Value3	 0.000051	 0.000067	
	 (0.000)	 	 	 	 (0.000)	 	
N	 2520	 	 	 N	 2520	 	
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	 Bid	 Theoretical	 	 	 Bid	 Theoretical	
	 (APWP)	 prediction	 	 	 (APW)	 prediction	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Intercept	 2.462**	 0	 	 Intercept	 6.093**	 0	
	 (0.758)	 	 	 	 (1.697)	 	
Value3	 0.0000795***	 0.000067	 	 Value3	 0.0000645***	 0.000067	
	 (0.000)	 	 	 	 (0.000)	 	
































































The	 payoffs	 of	 the	 outside	 observer	 depend	 on	 the	 precision	 of	 her	 estimates.	 Once	 she	 has	
entered	value	estimates	for	all	bidders,	the	computer	draws	one	of	the	three	bidders	at	random.	
If	 the	outside	observer’s	estimate	 for	 this	bidder	 is	exactly	correct,	 she	obtains	40	points.	The	
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